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Local Government Law
by Ken E. Jarrard*
I.

ANTE LITEM NOTICE

During the survey period,' the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals examined the applicability of statutory ante
litem notice in the context of whistleblower actions against
municipalities, while the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed strict
compliance in assessing the sufficiency of ante litem notice presented to
departments of the state under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA). 2
In West v. City of Albany, 3 a former city employee brought a federal
lawsuit against the city and two individuals that included claims under
the Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA).4 The GWA claims sought money
damages for alleged retaliation for disclosing financial irregularities in
the city's utility department. 5 After the city moved to dismiss the GWA
claims for failure to provide ante litem notice, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified to the Georgia Supreme
Court the question of whether ante litem notice pursuant to section
36-33-56 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) was
required for the plaintiff to pursue a money damages claim against the
city under the GWA.7 The supreme court answered in the negative,

*Founding Partner in the firm of Jarrard and Davis, LLP, Cumming, Georgia. Middle
Tennessee State University (B.S., 1990); University of Tennessee, Knoxville (M.P.A., 1992;
J.D., cum laude, 1995). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee. Special recognition
is deserved to the following for their invaluable contributions: Paul B. Frickey, Esq., Sarah
B. VanVolkenburgh, Esq., G. Aaron Meyer, Esq., Molly N. Esswein, Esq., Sam P.
VanVolkenburgh, Esq., Jeffrey M. Strickland, Esq., J. Paul Mitchell, Esq., Kayla F. Van
Oosterwick, Esq., and Mark D. Sperry, Esq.
1. For an analysis of local government law during the prior survey period, see Ken E.
Jarrard, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Georgia, 68 MERCER L. REV. 199 (2016).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20-37 (2017).
3. 300 Ga. 743, 797 S.E.2d 809 (2017).
4. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 (2017).
5. West, 300 Ga. at 743, 797 S.E.2d at 809.
6. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2017).
7. West, 300 Ga. at 743, 797 S.E.2d at 809.
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holding not only that the plaintiff was not required to provide ante litem
notice to the city to pursue a claim for retaliation under the GWA but
also holding, generally, that the municipal ante litem notice statute is
applicable only to damages claims sounding in negligence rather than
damages claims arising out of intentional acts.8
In so holding, the court examined the plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 36-33-5 in comparison to that employed in the GWA. The court
recognized that the GWA contained no pre-suit notice requirement while
subsection (b) of the municipal ante litem statute9 required pre-suit
notice setting forth "the time, place, and extent of the injury, as nearly
as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury."10 The
supreme court concluded that "it is obvious .

.

. that the municipal ante

litem statute contemplates an injury sustained as a result of a negligent
act or omission" as opposed to an intentional act.11 The court then
reasoned that, because the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 applies
only to damages caused by negligence and not to damages caused by
intentional acts, a damages claim brought under the GWA, which by
definition involves an intentional act, was not subject to the
requirements of the municipal ante litem notice statute. 12 The court
concluded that it would "not graft the provisions of the municipal ante
litem notice statute onto a completely separate statute that waives
sovereign immunity and authorizes a retaliatory discharge action
against a municipality without any requirement of pre-suit notice."1 3 The
court overruled any prior Georgia Court of Appeals decisions holding that
the municipal ante litem notice statute applies to claims other than
negligence claims.1 4
The ripple effect from West was felt shortly thereafter in Riggins v.
City of Atlanta,15 where the Georgia Court of Appeals referenced West in
reversing the superior court's determination that lack of compliance with
the municipal ante litem notice statute barred the plaintiffs GWA
retaliation claim against the city.16

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 745-49, 797 S.E.2d at 812-14.
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(b) (2017).
West, 300 Ga. at 744, 797 S.E.2d at 811 (emphasis added).
Id. at 746, 797 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 746-47, 797 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 748, 797 S.E.2d at 813-14.
Id.
340 Ga. App. 895, 798 S.E.2d 730 (2017).
Id. at 896, 798 S.E.2d at 730-31.
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In Georgia Department of Transportation v. King,'7 the court of
appeals grappled with whether a complainant's ante litem notice
provided sufficient specificity, as required by the GTCA, as to the amount
of personal injury loss. Prior to filing suit in King, the ante litem notice
presented to the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) stated
that King would claim "the full amount of damages allowed by law," but
did not specify a particular dollar amount.' 8 The Bibb County State Court
denied the GDOT's motion to dismiss after determining that, because the
GTCA caps the amount of damages under the Act at $1 million, the
reference in King's ante litem notice to "the full amount of damages
allowed by law" was sufficient.1 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, reiterating that "strict
compliance with these ante litem notice requirements is necessary, and
substantial compliance is insufficient." 20 The court explained that King's
ante litem notice was fatally flawed because the notice failed to state the
amount of loss of which King was aware at the time of sending the
notice. 21 The court stressed that a claimant's losses in excess of the GTCA
cap are relevant to the issue of settlement and, since the notice
requirement is designed to facilitate settlement before the filing of a
lawsuit, it is critical that the state receive adequate notice of the
magnitude of the claim. 22
In Williams v. Willcox State Prison,23 strict compliance with the
GTCA's ante litem notice requirement was also tested. 24 Williams filed a
complaint for damages against the Georgia Department of Corrections
(GDOC) "alleging that, while visiting Wilcox State Prison, she 'tripped
and fell over uneven floor [in] the visitor's bathroom,' which resulted in
severe bodily injury." 25 The complaint "alleged that the GDOC 'did not
act reasonably in inspecting or maintaining the ground so as to prevent
or correct the dangerous and hazardous condition of the ground."' 26 The
Monroe County Superior Court granted the GDOC's motion to dismiss
based upon a failure to strictly comply with the requirements of
identifying the acts or omissions that caused the loss and the nature of

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

341 Ga. App. 102, 798 S.E.2d 492 (2017).
Id. at 102, 798 S.E.2d at 493-94.
Id. at 102, 798 S.E.2d at 494.
Id. at 104, 798 S.E.2d at 495.
Id. at 104-05, 798 S.E.2d at 495-96.
Id. at 105, 798 S.E.2d at 495.
341 Ga. App. 290, 799 S.E.2d 811 (2017).
Id. at 290, 799 S.E.2d at 811.
Id. at 290, 799 S.E.2d at 812.
Id.
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In affirming, the court of appeals held that the complaint's

allegations premised on uneven flooring were based on an entirely
different set of factual allegations than Williams's ante litem notices,
which alleged that Williams slipped and fell due to a water hazard. 28 The
court also held that the ante litem notice failed to provide sufficient
details of the type of injuries sustained since the notices stated only that
Williams incurred "serious injuries" without providing specific details as
to the particular injuries suffered. 29
II. ZONING AND LAND USE

In Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm
Homeowners Ass'n, 30 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a county
zoning ordinance retroactively impairing the exercise of a vested right
was unconstitutional. 31 Southern States acquired a vested right for a
nonconforming use and sought to obtain from the county the certificates
needed to develop and operate a landfill. However, the county later
enacted an ordinance mandating that any vested rights for a
nonconforming use be exercised within one year or else be lost. 32 On
appeal from the trial court's award of partial summary judgment in favor
of private property owners who sued to stop landfill development, the
Georgia Supreme Court noted that the Georgia constitution prohibits
retrospective laws that impair the vested rights of citizens. 33 Because the
prohibition against retroactive impairment of vested rights extends to
ordinance was held to be
zoning regulations, 34 the county
unconstitutional as applied to Southern States. 35
In City of Cumming v. Flowers,36 the Georgia Supreme Court
disapproved a significant line of cases, of which Jackson v. Spalding
County37 was the lead, regarding the appropriate mechanism to appeal a
quasi-judicial decision by a local zoning board. 38 The supreme court held
that neighbors disappointed with the quasi-judicial decision of the city's

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 291, 799 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 293, 799 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 294, 799 S.E.2d at 814.
300 Ga. 609, 797 S.E.2d 468 (2017).
Id. at 613, 797 S.E.2d at 472.
Id. at 610, 797 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 611, 797 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 612, 797 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 613, 797 S.E.2d at 472.
300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995).
Flowers, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
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board of zoning appeals (the BZA) granting a variance were required to
seek review of the BZA's decision by petition for certiorari in the superior
court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-4-139 and, therefore, mandamus was
unavailable, even though it was mandated by the city's code. 40
In Stroud v. Hall County,41 the court of appeals provided clarification
as to a county's liability for inverse condemnation based on an alleged
permanent versus continuing nuisance causing flooding damage. 42 In
Stroud, the plaintiffs alleged that a county road abutting their property
caused flooding during rain events. Concluding that the nuisance alleged
by the plaintiffs was permanent in nature, the Hall County Superior
Court granted summary judgment based in part on the statute of
limitations. 43 After discussing the nature of permanent and continuing
nuisances in general, the court of appeals held, contrary to the trial court,
that the Strouds could pursue their claim "to the extent that the Strouds'
nuisance claim is based on harm caused by the County's maintenance of
the Road." 44 However, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court to the extent the Strouds' claim was based on harm caused by
the existence of the road itself, a permanent nuisance, as such a claim
was barred by the statute of limitations. 45
In City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Management, Inc., 4 6 the
court of appeals concluded that a planning director's determination that
a particular use was allowed by right under the city's zoning ordinance
did not require prior notice to neighbors where such notice was not
required by the zoning ordinance.47 Without notice to adjoining property
owners, the planning director issued a letter finding that Discovery's
proposed use of property constituted a family personal care home under
the zoning ordinances and that such a use under the pertinent zoning
ordinance was as of right. Following that administrative decision, certain
neighbors became aware of the proposed use and filed an application to
administratively appeal the planning director's decision that the
proposed use would be a family personal care home and allowed as of
right. The zoning board of appeals sustained the appeal and reversed the
planning director's decision due to the director's failure to notify the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2017).
Jackson, 265 Ga. at 834, 462 S.E.2d at 857.
339 Ga. App. 37, 793 S.E.2d 104 (2016).
Id. at 38, 793 S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 43 n.4, 793 S.E.2d at 110 n.4.
Id. at 43, 793 S.E.2d at 110 (emphasis added).
Id. at 43-44, 793 S.E.2d at 110.
338 Ga. App. 135, 789 S.E.2d 386 (2016).
Id. at 139, 789 S.E.2d at 390.

210

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

property owners. 48 The Discovery appealed that decision whereupon the
Dekalb County Superior Court reversed, thus reinstating the planning
director's original determination. 49 Finding the zoning ordinance's
treatment of family personal care homes as a matter of right and the
zoning ordinance's notice requirements to be plain and unambiguous, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.50 This case is
consistent with Buckner v. Douglas County,5 1 which held that an
incorrectdetermination on vesting by a local government that authorizes
a property owner to develop in derogation of the existing zoning
ordinance can violate the zoning procedures law if no notice and hearing
is provided, while, ipso facto, a correct vesting determination carries no
such procedural requirements.5 2

III. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
In Mayor of Garden City v. Harris,5 3 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the Georgia Recreational Property Act (RPA)54 was unavailable to
limit liability for injuries sustained by a child who gained entry into a
recreational area at no charge. The RPA provides, in part, that an owner
of land who invites or permits without charge any person to use the
property for recreation does not extend any assurance that the premises
are safe and does not assume responsibility or incur liability for any
injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such
persons.5 5 The Chatham County State Court denied the city's motion for
summary judgment, finding the RPA did not protect the city from
liability because the football stadium was not open to the general public
at no charge.56 Adults and other students were charged an entry fee, but
children under a certain age, like the one injured, were allowed to enter
for free.5 7 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding
no merit in the city's argument that the charge exception should be

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 135, 789 S.E.2d at 387.
Id. at 141, 789 S.E.2d at 391.
273 Ga. App. 765, 615 S.E.2d 850 (2005).
Id. at 766-67, 615 S.E.2d at 852.
339 Ga. App. 452, 793 S.E.2d 628 (2016).
O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20-26 (2017).
See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-23.
Harris, 339 Ga. App. at 453, 793 S.E.2d at 629.
Id.
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applied on a per person basis.58 The Georgia Supreme Court has granted
certiorari.59
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN
60
Curry v. Department of Transportation
clarifies the standards for
compensating a condemnee for lost or diminished access to a roadway. In
Curry, the GDOT condemned a portion of property, which included the
owner's access to one of two roadways. The GDOT correspondingly
converted the roadway to a limited access highway, resulting in the
owner's loss of access to the original roadway. The owner retained access
to an adjacent highway.6 1 On appeal from a jury verdict, the owner
argued that the following jury instruction constituted reversible error:

[A] property owner is not entitled to access at all points on the
boundary between his property and the public right of way, but is
entitled to convenient access. If the means of access are not
substantially interfered with, the property owner is not entitled to
consequential damages for loss of access. 62
The owner argued that, in McDonald v. Department of
63
Transportation,
an almost identical charge had been found to constitute
64
reversible error, and thus, the same result should occur here.
The court of appeals affirmed for the GDOT, agreeing that while the
two cases had nearly identical facts, the jury instructions in the two cases
were not comparable.6 5 The court explained that the jury instructions
had to be viewed as a whole and, while the instructions here contained
language somewhat similar to the language in McDonald, in Department
of Transportation v. Whitehead,6 6 the jury instructions employed
language approved by the supreme court.6 7 That sanctioned instruction
emphasized that a condemnee must be compensated for losing access to
a public road, but in determining damages, the jury may consider

58.
59.
*1 (Ga.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 456, 793 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 452, 793 S.E.2d at 628, cert. granted, No. S17CO692, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 506, at
June 5, 2017).
341 Ga. App. 482, 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017).
Id. at 482, 801 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 485, 801 S.E.2d at 97.
247 Ga. App. 763, 544 S.E.2d 747 (2001).
Curry, 341 Ga. App. at 486, 801 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 487, 801 S.E.2d at 99.
253 Ga. 150, 317 S.E.2d 542 (1984).
McDonald, 247 Ga. App. at 766, 544 S.E.2d at 749.
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whether the condemnee has an alternative means of access. 68 As such,
the jury instructions in Curry were not misleading and no reversible
error had been committed. 69
V. IMMUNITIES

Tucker7 0

Pearce, et al. v.
arose from a wrongful death suit filed against
a Glynn County police officer after plaintiffs husband committed suicide
while in custody. The Brantley County Superior Court denied the officer's
motion for summary judgment, whereafter the court of appeals reversed
the judgment, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that any
negligent act by the officer proximately caused the husband's death.7 1
One question before the court was whether the officer's failure to
comply with a departmental policy requiring the officer to conduct a
medical screening of plaintiffs husband prior to placing him in a
temporary holding cell was a failure to perform a ministerial or
discretionary act. The policy in question required intake officers to
complete a screening form prior to placing an individual in a temporary
holding cell, to include screening for the current health of the detainee
and any medications taken by the detainee, and to perform a mental and
physical health evaluation. It was undisputed that the intake officer
failed to complete a screening form. 72
The supreme court had little difficulty concluding that completion of
the screening form was in the nature of a ministerial function. The key
to the analysis of immunity in Pearce was the nature of the duty of the
intake officer. At the trial court level, the plaintiff argued that failure to
complete the screening form was the dispositive issue while conceding it
was not completion of the "screening form" but a failure in the manner of
"medical screening" that was the critical lapse. 73 The supreme court
noted that plaintiffs "shifting theory of negligence" muddled its
analysis.7 4 Ultimately, the court contented itself that the critical duty
was not the completion of a form, but the manner in which the medical
screening was conducted. The medical screening was discretionary in
nature and one for which the intake officer was entitled to official

68. Curry, 341 Ga. App. at 487-88, 801 S.E.2d at 99 (comparingMcDonald, 247 Ga.
App. at 763-65, 544 S.E.2d at 748-49 with Dep't of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150,
151-52, 317 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1984)).
69. Id. at 488, 801 S.E.2d at 99.
70. 299 Ga. 224, 787 S.E.2d 749 (2016).
71. Id. at 224, 787 S.E.2d at 750.
72. Id. at 224, 787 S.E.2d at 751.
73. Id. at 226, 787 S.E.2d at 751.
74. Id. at 227-28, 787 S.E.2d at 752-53.

2017]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

213

immunity. The supreme court concluded by observing that "Officer
Tucker could have completed a 'medical screening' in any number of
ways, including simple observation" and "[u]nder the circumstances of
this case, the duty as described by Appellant, even if mandated by policy,
would be discretionary in nature." 75
In Roper v. Greenway,78 the court was confronted with a similar
issue. 7 7 In Roper, the decision at issue was a discretionary decision
regarding how a police officer should request a hospitalized individual to
complete a dog ownership form. The act was immediately converted to a
ministerial function upon the officer actually handing the form to the
owner and the owner's ensuing interaction with the officer.78 The court
held that the discretionary decision and the implementation of that
decision are part of the same action and that immunity analysis cannot
be bifurcated.79 In Pearce, by contrast, the issue under review was the
ministerial function of completing a medical screening form, whereby the
only method of completing the form was by undertaking the discretionary
function of conducting an actual medical screening. A preliminary
takeaway from Roper and Pearce is that, when faced with activities
blurring the lines of ministerial and discretionary functions, the court
tends to land on the side favoring public officer immunity. 8
May v. City of Nahunta81 involved an appeal to determine whether an
otherwise legitimate mental health intervention was converted into an
unconstitutional one based upon the seizing law enforcement officer's
conduct. 82 Based on its finding that the officer had probable cause to seize
May, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia granted the officer qualified immunity with respect to May's
federal claims. 83 Additionally, the district court concluded that no clearly
established law would have put the officer on notice that his actions
during the authorized seizure were unlawful. 84 As to May's state-law
claims, the district court found that the officer was entitled to official
immunity because May had not met the burden of demonstrating that

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
351.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 228-29, 787 S.E.2d at 753.
294 Ga. 112, 751 S.E.2d 351 (2013).
Id. at 112-13, 751 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 114, 751 S.E.2d at 353.
Id.
See generally Pearce, 229 Ga. 224, 787 S.E.2d 749; Roper, 294 Ga. 112, 751 S.E.2d
846 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
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the officer acted with actual malice. 85 The district court also granted
summary judgment in favor of a second officer and the city.8 6
After review of the record, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit found no reason to disturb the district court's ruling on
the issue of official immunity. 7 However, on the federal claims, the court
held that the officer was protected by qualified immunity from May's
challenge of his decision to seize and transport her to the hospital, but he
was not entitled to qualified immunity from May's claims challenging the
manner of such seizure.8 8 The court held that "[g]iven that '[t]he Fourth
Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of
governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation,' the
manner in which a seizure is conducted is 'as vital a part of the inquiry
as whether [it was] warranted at all."'89 Therefore, under certain
circumstances, an initially constitutional seizure can become
unconstitutional where it is executed in an extraordinary manner, a
question which turns upon the manner in which it is executed.90 The
court held that the record established that the officer's mental-health
seizure of May, who suffered from cerebral atrophy, was conducted in an
extraordinary manner.9 1 Upon arriving at May's residence, in response
to a 911 call, the officer asked the on-scene EMTs to leave the room and
locked the door behind them. The officer then instructed May to disrobe
in his presence into more suitable clothing, during which time he refused
to leave the room. Further, the officer touched her shoulder roughly in an
effort to pull off her nightgown, and threatened May by patting his gun
stating "[Y]es, you will" when May refused to remove her undergarments.
Moreover, the foregoing activities lasted approximately twenty
minutes. 92 The court held that given the officer's
alleged disregard for May's privacy, his use of forcible language
coupled with the threat of deadly force, the prolonged duration of the
seizure, and the inappropriateness inherent in the circumstances ...
"the supposed facts of this case take the manner of [seizure] well

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
(1968)).
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1326-27.
at 1327.
at 1333 n.9.
at 1333.
at 1330 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 28, 28-29

Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1326.
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beyond the 'hazy border' that sometimes separates lawful conduct from
unlawful conduct." 93
The court held that "the violation was obvious." 94 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity with
respect to the initial seizure, but reversed and remanded on the question
of whether the officer's conduct during the seizure was conducted in an
extraordinary manner unusually harmful to May's Fourth Amendment95
privacy interests.96 This case reiterates the critical importance of
analyzing both the issue of whether a seizure was justified at its
inception, and the separate but related issue of whether the seizure was
executed in an extraordinary and unconstitutional manner in
determining when a government actor is entitled to qualified immunity.
VI. TORT

A. Negligence
City of Richmond Hill v. Maia97 involved the suicide of a young woman
following a police officer's disclosure of photos of the woman's previous
suicide attempt. The woman's mother sued the city and police officer for
negligently disclosing the photos, alleging that the officer could have
anticipated such disclosure would cause public humiliation and a
corresponding suicide attempt. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing lack of proximate causation because suicide is an
unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks any causal connection
between alleged negligent conduct and resulting death.98 Reversing the
trial and appellate courts, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the
act of suicide severed the required chain of proximate causation.9 9 The
court reiterated that, as a general rule, suicide defeats proximate
causality, subject to two narrow exceptions: the "rage or frenzy" exception
where "the tortfeasor's wrongful act causes the injured party to kill
himself during a rage or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable
impulse," and the "special relationship" exception where the
circumstances create a special duty of care, such as between a doctor and

93. Id. at 1332 (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1283
(11th Cir. 2005)).

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
May, 846 F.3d at 1333.
301 Ga. 257, 800 S.E.2d 573 (2017).
Id. at 257, 800 S.E.2d at 575.

99. Id.
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patient or jailor and jailed. 100 A jury could not reasonably apply either
exception to the facts in the record; therefore, this negligence claim failed
as a matter of law. 101

B. Nuisance
In City of Stone Mountain v. Black, 102 homeowners asserted nuisance
claims against the city for flooding their property. The plaintiffs sought
damages for both their inconvenience during the flood event (measured
by diminution in rental value) and the permanent diminution in resale
value of their home due to the stigma of having been flooded. The city
argued that diminution in resale value damages are only available to
remedy permanent nuisances, and thus, unavailable in the case of an
abatable nuisance. 103 However, the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected
that limitation, holding that, even in an abatable nuisance case, "Georgia
law does not 'preclude [ a diminution in value award in addition to
restoration and repair costs where the repair does not fully restore the
property to its pre-damage value."' 104 The court noted that insofar as the
flooding gave rise to irreparable stigma impacting the property's fair
market value, this could be compensated in addition to the cost to repair
the home and the inconvenience suffered by the homeowners, and that
these two elements of recovery would not constitute an impermissible
double recovery. 105
VII. CONTRACTS

A. Suits to Enforce ContractRights
Moore v. Thomas County Public Library Systemoe serves as a
reminder to public authorities, public boards, and similar entities that
the power to form a contract is not necessarily accompanied by the power
to enforce a contract. When a long-time system administrator at the
Thomas County Public Library System sued the library system in federal
court for alleged civil rights violations, the library system successfully
moved to dismiss on grounds that it was not a body capable of being

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 259 n.3, 800 S.E.2d at 577 n.3.
Id. at 261, 800 S.E.2d at 578.
340 Ga. App. 630, 797 S.E.2d 927 (2017).
Id at 630, 797 S.E.2d at 927.

104. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Royal Capital Dev. LLC v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
291 Ga. 262, 266, 728 S.E.2d 234, 237 (2012)).

105. Id. at 631-32, 797 S.E.2d at 928-29.
106. No. 7:16-CV-28(HL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75090, at *1 (M.D. Ga. June 9, 2016).
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sued. 107 The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, Valdosta Division observed that under settled Georgia law, only
three classes of legal entities may sue and be sued: "(1) natural persons;
(2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial
persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue."108 While the
statute enabling creation of county library systems did not expressly
grant the right to sue or be sued, the plaintiff argued that the court could
infer such a right from the express statutory grant of the power to
contract.10 9 However, the court found this argument foreclosed by the
Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Clark v. Fitzgerald Water, Light
Bond Commission,110 which held that "the simple power to enter into a
contract .

.

. does not carry with it the implied authority to sue or be

sued."n
1. Enforcement of Bonds and Letters of Credit
In Douglas County v. Hamilton State Bank,112 the Georgia Court of
Appeals clarified that a county must exhaust all administrative remedies
offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) before
suing to enforce a surety bond defaulted on by a surety placed under
FDIC receivership. This holding appears to be a departure from the
national trend of case law.113 In this case, Douglas County sued to recover
upon subdivision construction performance bonds. The defendant was
not the bank that issued the bonds, which had been placed in FDIC
receivership, but instead Hamilton State Bank, to whom the FDIC had
sold the assets and liabilities of the defunct bank. Hamilton State Bank
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that
Douglas County had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies offered
by the FDIC.114 The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed. It held that
jurisdiction was removed by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),115 which requires administrative
exhaustion before a suit can be heard on "any claim relating to any act or

107. Id.
108. Id. at *3-4 (quoting Clark v. Fitzgerald Water, Light & Bond Comm'n, 284 Ga. 12,
12, 663 S.E.2d 237, 238 (2008)).
109. Id. at *5.
110. 284 Ga. 12, 663 S.E.2d 237 (2008).
111. Moore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75090, at *6 (quoting Clark, 281 Ga. at 15, 663 S.E.2d
at 240).
112. 340 Ga. App. 801, 798 S.E.2d 509 (2017).
113. Id. at 807-09, 798 S.E.2d at 514-15.
114. Id. at 804, 798 S.E.2d at 512.
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (2017).
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omission" of an institution under receivership of the FDIC.116 While the
county was attempting to recover from Hamilton State Bank, its claims
were based on the initial failure of the defunct bank to satisfy its surety
obligations. 117 The court of appeals acknowledged the "seeming
absurdity" of the exhaustion requirement under the circumstances, as
well as various judicial decisions outside of Georgia reaching a contrary
result, but found that its holding was required by the plain language of
FIRREA.118 The takeaway lesson is awareness that a surety bond in
default may carry FDIC exhaustion requirements, even after the surety
liability has been transferred to a successor entity.11 9
B. Workers' CompensationInsurance Requirements
Local governments will often require contractors and consultants to
maintain minimum insurance coverage, and one such requirement is
statutory workers' compensation coverage. Wills v. Clay County120
demonstrates that in many cases this requirement is not necessary to
protect a government from liability. In Wills, the county hired a
contractor to renovate its gymnasium. 12 1 The contractor represented he
was not required by the Georgia workers' compensation scheme to have
insurance, and the county agreed to remove this requirement from their
contract. 122 When one of the contractor's crew of laborers was injured and
filed suit, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the contractor
was indeed statutorily required to maintain workers' compensation
coverage. 123 The court held, however, the county was not liable to provide
workers' compensation benefits to the injured worker, and therefore was
properly dismissed from the laborer's lawsuit. 124 As owner of the
gymnasium, the county was not a "statutory employer" under the
workers' compensation scheme. 125 In sum, the county's failure to insist

116. Hamilton, 340 Ga. App. at 806, 798 S.E.2d at 513.
117. Id. at 806-07, 798 S.E.2d at 513.
118. Id. at 809-10, 798 S.E.2d at 515.
119. See generally id.
120. 339 Ga. App. 79, 793 S.E.2d 432 (2016).
121. Id. at 79, 793 S.E.2d at 434.
122. Id. at 79-80, 793 S.E.2d at 434.
123. Id. at 80-81, 793 S.E.2d at 434-35.
124. Id. at 81-82, 793 S.E.2d at 435.
125. Georgia's workers' compensation statute provides that "a principal, intermediate,
or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured ... to the same
extent as the immediate employer." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (2017).

2017]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

219

on maintenance of workers' compensation insurance in the renovation
contract was harmless. 126

C. Service Delivery Strategies
Under the Georgia Service Delivery Strategy Law, 127 a county and its
constituent cities are required to agree upon the efficient division of
government services provided to residents. City of Waycross v. Pierce
County Board of Commissioners 128 shows the importance of precise
draftsmanship in such agreements when county-city relationships
deteriorate. Problems began when the City of Waycross, located partially
in Pierce County, was by local legislation deannexed from its Pierce
County territory. Under the Pierce County service delivery strategy
(SDS), the City of Waycross was authorized to provide water and sewer
service within "city limits." Upon deannexation, the city terminated
water and sewer service to the newly deannexed area on grounds that
the area was now outside the "city limits" and, thus, outside the area
where the city could legally provide service. 129 Pierce County, joined by
intervenor businesses in the deannexed area, sued for an interlocutory
injunction to maintain service. An injunction was granted by the trial
court and affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.130
A four-part test controls the grant of an interlocutory injunction and,
given the threat to public health caused by cessation of water and sewer
service, the first factor (irreparable injury), second factor (balance of
harms), and fourth factor (general public interest) were easily met. 131 As
for the third factor (likelihood of success on the merits), the court
determined some likelihood of success because the phrase "city limits" in
the SDS was ambiguous-it was not clear whether this meant "city
limits" as they existed in 1999 when the SDS was signed or the current
"city limits." 132 The case offers a lesson for the drafting of SDS

agreements: When referencing a legal boundary, specify whether the
reference is to the boundary on a particular date.

126. Wills, 339 Ga. App. at 83, 793 S.E.2d at 436.
127. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-1-5 (2017).
128. 300 Ga. 109, 793 S.E.2d 389 (2016).
129. Id. at 110, 793 S.E.2d at 391. The Georgia Constitution states that, unless
otherwise provided by law, no municipality may provide services "outside its own
boundaries except by contract with the county or municipality affected." GA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2, para. 3(b)(2).
130. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 300 Ga. at 111, 793 S.E.2d at 392.
131. Id. at 112-13, 793 S.E.2d at 392-93.
132. Id. at 113, 793 S.E.2d at 392-93.
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VIII. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Attorney's Fees Recovery as Sanctions
In O'Neal v. Crawford County,133 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered an issue of first impression concerning the right to recover
attorney's fees as sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. When Crawford
County denied the county coroner's request for a larger budget, it also
agreed to fund the coroner's mandamus and declaratory judgment
lawsuit seeking to compel the county to increase the budget.1 34 The
coroner's claims were dismissed as frivolous and meritless, and pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) and (b),135 the Crawford County Superior Court
ordered the coroner to reimburse the county's cost of the defense as well
as payments made by the county to the coroner's attorney for bringing
the lawsuit.136 The court of appeals reversed the award of the coroner's
own attorney's fees, finding that portion of the award contrary to the
provision in O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d)137 that "[a]ttorney's fees and expenses
of litigation awarded under this Code section shall not exceed amounts
which are reasonable and necessary for defending or asserting the rights
of a party." 38 Per the court of appeals, the payments to the coroner's
attorney "were not necessary for defending or asserting the County's
rights" and therefore not reimbursable. 139
B. Proof of Service on a PublicEntity
According to the Georgia Civil Practice Act, 140 personal service of
process upon a county or city must be made "to the chairman of the board
of commissioners, president of the council of trustees, mayor or city
manager of the city, or to an agent authorized by appointment to receive
service of process" and service of process upon "any other public body or
organization subject to an action" must be made "to the chief executive
officer or clerk thereof." 141 In Russell v. Muscogee County School
District,142 the Georgia Court of Appeals reiterated that a challenge to
the adequacy of service under the aforementioned provision must be
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

339 Ga. App. 687, 792 S.E.2d 498 (2016).
Id. at 687, 792 S.E.2d at 498.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a)-(b) (2017).
O'Neal, 339 Ga. App. at 688, 792 S.E.2d at 499.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d) (2017).
Id.
O'Neal, 339 Ga. App. at 691, 792 S.E.2d at 500-01 (emphasis in original).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e) (2017).
341 Ga. App. 229, 800 S.E.2d 7 (2017).
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accompanied by competent evidence showing that service falls outside
the statutory requirements. 143
Seeking to open a default judgment and dismiss for improper service
of process, the Muscogee County School District (MCSD) argued that
service upon an assistant in its Human Resources (HR) Department was
insufficient. 144 The Muscogee County Superior Court agreed with the
MCSD's contention that the HR assistant was not a "clerk" of its chief
executive officer. 145 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, noting the
complete lack of record evidence that the assistant was not a "clerk"
within the meaning of the statute. 146 Citing Murray v. Sloan PaperCo., 1 4 7

the court emphasized MCSD bore the burden of presenting affirmative
evidence that the HR assistant in question was not a "clerk," and that
MCSD "failed to present the trial court with any evidence, whether by
affidavit or otherwise," to make its point. 148 Accordingly, when disputing
the validity of service upon a purported "clerk," governmental bodies
should recall Russell's admonition to be prepared with competent
evidence regarding the subject employee's authority. 149
IX. OPEN RECORDS

In Media General Operations, Inc. v. St. Lawrence,150 the Chatham
County Sheriffs Office denied Media General Operations' request for
video footage and internal affairs investigative reports regarding the
death of an arrestee, asserting that the records were exempt under
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) 15 1 because the footage and reports had been
provided to "the district attorney for use in an on-going criminal
investigation." 1 52 After Media General renewed its request, the sheriff
and district attorney filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration exempting the requested records from disclosure. 153 The
Chatham County Superior Court determined the sheriffs office was not

143. See id. at 233, 800 S.E.2d at 10.
144. Id. at 230, 800 S.E.2d at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 233, 800 S.E.2d at 10.
147. 212 Ga. App. 648, 442 S.E.2d 795 (1994).
148. Russell, 341 Ga. App. at 233, 800 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Murray, 212 Ga. App. at 649,
442 S.E.2d at 797).
149. See id.
150 337 Ga. App. 428, 787 S.E.2d 778 (2016).
151. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (2017).
152. St. Lawrence, 337 Ga. App. at 429, 787 S.E.2d at 780.
153. Id. at 430, 787 S.E.2d at 780.
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required to release the records under the Open Records Act (ORA),
because the prosecution was still pending. 154
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that records
pertaining to the arrestee were exempt from disclosure under the
pending prosecution exemption to the ORA. 155 That exemption provides,
in pertinent part, that "records of law enforcement, prosecution, or
regulatory agencies" are exempt in any pending investigation, but the
exemption does "not apply to records in the possession of an agency that
is the subject of the pending investigation .. . ."156 The court held that the
"agency" provision of the statute was inapplicable because the sheriffs
office itself was not the subject of the pending investigation and
prosecution, noting that instead, individual employees of the sheriffs
office were being investigated in connection with the death. 157 The court
noted the definition of "agency" in O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1158 as "[e]very
department,

...

office,

..

. or similar body of each . .. county . .. of the

state."159 As the term "agency" does not include the employees of the
agency, the court held that the records were properly withheld under
60
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4).o
In Blalock v. Cartwright,61 a requester filed a petition for writ of
mandamus seeking to compel the mayor of Lovejoy to respond to his ORA
request in accordance with Georgia law. 162 The Clayton County Superior
Court granted the mayor's motion to dismiss, finding that the ORA's civil
penalties provided a remedy "as complete and convenient as
mandamus." 163 Although the Georgia Supreme Court did not agree with
the trial court's conclusion regarding the remedial adequacy of civil
penalties, the court upheld the trial court's ruling because the ORA
provides its own cause of action for enforcement. 164 The court questioned
whether the civil penalties provided for in the ORA are recoverable by
private litigants, as that portion of the ORA refers only to the Attorney
General. However, the court held that even if civil penalties were
available to Blalock, the recovery of those penalties would not constitute

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 433, 787 S.E.2d at 782.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
St. Lawrence, 337 Ga. App. at 431-32, 787 S.E.2d at 781.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 (2017).
St. Lawrence, 337 Ga. App. at 432, 787 S.E.2d at 781.
Id.
300 Ga. 884, 799 S.E.2d 225 (2017).
Id. at 884, 799 S.E.2d at 226.
Id.
Id.
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an adequate remedy: A monetary award is simply no substitute for access
to the information found in government records. 65 Thus, the court
disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that mandamus was precluded
due to the alternate remedy of civil penalties.166 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the ORA's enforcement provisions afford an adequate
alternative remedy such that a resort to mandamus is unnecessary and
improper.167
The court reasoned that aside from any potential action for civil
penalties, the ORA expressly creates a private right of action to enforce
the obligations imposed on persons or agencies having custody of records
open to the public.1 68 Further, the court noted that litigants have
routinely availed themselves of this right of action without resorting to
mandamus.1 69 Prior to creation of the private right of action in 1982,
mandamus would have been a proper mechanism for compelling ORA
compliance.1 70 As the private right of action now exists, the court held
that mandamus relief is not only unnecessary, but improper. 171

In Consumer Credit Research Foundation v. Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia,172 the court of appeals reviewed the
discretionary implementation of statutory exemptions to the ORA. This
case involved a consulting agreement between the Consumer Credit
Research Foundation and the Kennesaw State University Research and
Service Foundation where a Kennesaw State University (KSU) professor
conducted statistical research and analysis relating to "payday" loans. 173
KSU received an ORA request from a third party for copies of
correspondence relating to the professor's research, and KSU informed
the foundation it intended to release the responsive research
correspondence in redacted form to the requester. The foundation
objected to release of the records, and filed an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Board of Regents to prevent the release.1 74
The Fulton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the
Board of Regents and ruled that the two research exceptions in the ORA
authorized an agency to withhold such records, but that the ORA did not

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 887, 799 S.E.2d at 228.
Id.
Id. at 888, 799 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 887, 799 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 888, 799 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 888, 799 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.
341 Ga. App. 323, 800 S.E.2d 24 (2017).
Id. at 324, 800 S.E.2d at 25.
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mandate nondisclosure. 175 The Consumer Credit Research Foundation
appealed.176

The court of appeals held that KSU could hot release correspondence
if some fell within the scope of statutory research exceptions to disclosure
contained in the ORA and remanded the issue of whether the exceptions
did apply. In reviewing whether KSU had discretion to release records
potentially subject to an exemption, the court looked to another Georgia
Supreme Court case, Bowers v. Shelton,17 7 and applied the same
reasoning and analysis from that case. Noting that the state could not
waive the rights of third parties who had an interest in confidential
information statutorily exempted from disclosure under the ORA,178
"Bowers establish[ed] that when a state agency plans to disclose public
records to the public in response to an [ORA] request, a private party is
entitled to bring suit . . . and enjoin the agency from disclosing the
records, if the records .. . fall within a statutory exception to the ORA."179

Thus, in light of the decision in Bowers, the court held that agencies
cannot allow exempted information to be made public, and do not have
the discretion to disclose records exempt from disclosure under the
ORA.180 Accordingly, the Consumer Credit Research Foundation was
entitled to enjoin KSU from disclosing the research correspondence to the
requester if the Foundation showed that the correspondence fell within
one or both of the research exceptions found in the ORA. 181
X. TAX

The courts issued four potentially sea-changing opinions during the
survey period. In Montgomery County v. Hamilton,182 the Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the Montgomery County Superior
Court's grant of summary judgment to a class of taxpayers seeking a $1.1
million ad valorem tax refund on the grounds that the county had
exhausted the funding of authorized county services with insurance
premium tax revenues and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3(a)(1)(2), 183
was therefore obliged to use the remaining surplus to roll back its millage

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
743).
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 325-26, 800 S.E.2d at 26.
Id. at 326, 800 S.E.2d at 26.
265 Ga. 247, 453 S.E.2d 741 (1995).
Consumer Credit, 341 Ga. App. at 327-28, 800 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 328, 800 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 328, 800 S.E.2d at 27-28 (citing Bowers, 265 Ga. at 248-49, 453 S.E.2d at
Id.
337 Ga. App. 500, 788 S.E.2d 89 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3(a)(1)(2) (2017).
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rate. 184 Generally, O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3185 is intended to minimize funding
equity disputes between local governments in furtherance of the Service
Delivery Strategy Act.186 In that context, counties are authorized to fund
an enumerated list of services, including, among other things, police and
fire protection, "curbside or on-site" solid waste collection, and "[s]uch
other services as may be provided by the county governing authority for
the primary benefit of the inhabitants of the unincorporated area of the
county." 187 In the absence of such services, counties are directed to use
insurance premium tax revenues to roll back the millage rate on
properties within the unincorporated areas of the county.188
In Montgomery County, although the county did not provide "on-site"
solid waste collection, it did use insurance premium tax revenues, in part,
to fund several "convenience centers" where the general public was
permitted to dispose of their own solid waste at centralized locations.18 9
Relying on expressio unius est exclusio alterius90 and a "species of
noscitur a sociis,"191 the taxpayers argued, and the trial court agreed, that
the express mention of "on-site" waste collection in paragraph (a)(1)(C)
necessarily excluded off-site waste collection from the category of "such
other services" in the catch-all paragraph (a)(1)(E). 192
On appeal, however, the court held that the trial court's application of
interpretative cannons was flawed, noting specifically that any negative
implication that could have been drawn out of the enumerated list was
improper in this case where the words "such other" immediately

184. Hamilton, 337 Ga. App. at 506-07, 788 S.E.2d at 94-95.
185. O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3.
186. O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24(3)(A) and (B) (2017) (requiring "the cost of any service which a
county provides primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall be
borne by the unincorporated area residents . . . who receive the service" and providing that
such funding may be derived from, among other sources of revenue, insurance premium
taxes).
187. O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2017).
188. O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3(a)(2) (2017).
189. Montgomery, 337 Ga. App. at 500, 788 S.E.2d at 90.
190. Id. at 509, 788 S.E.2d at 96. "[T]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
the other." Id. (quoting McAlister v. Abam-Samson, 318 Ga. App. 1, 4 n.13, 733 S.E.2d 58,
61 n.13 (2012))
191. Id. at 507, 788 S.E.2d at 95. "[When] there is in the same statute a specific
provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include
matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general
provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular provision." Id. (quoting Mayor & Alderman of the
City of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 205 Ga. 429, 436-37, 54 S.E.2d 260, 265
(1949)).
192. Id. at 505, 788 S.E.2d at 93.
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preceding "services" implied that the catch-all services must be similar
to, but necessarily different in some respects from the enumerated
services. 193 Consequently, the court concluded the catch-all (a)(1)(E) must
be read to include services "provid[ing] for the health, safety, or welfare
of the residents of the unincorporated area" so long as they "primarily
benefit the residents of the unincorporated area" and, as such, off-site
waste collection was an authorized service under O.C.G.A. § 33-8-8.3.194
Heron Lake II Apartments, L.P. v. Lowndes County Board of Tax
Assessors195 has the potential to become a landmark decision in ad
valorem taxation. All real property is required to be uniformly19 6 assessed
at 40% of its fair market value,197 which is defined as "the amount a
knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property and a willing seller
would accept for the property at an arm's length, bona fide sale." 198
Within this framework, there exists a natural tension between the
constitutional mandate that all ad valorem tax exemptions be approved
by a two-thirds majority in each branch of the General Assembly and
approved in a referendum,19 9 and the legislative inclination to pursue
policy objectives through preferential tax treatment by requiring that
certain valuation elements are either included or excluded from
consideration in the determination of property value. 200
In Heron Lake II, the county board of assessors sought declaratory
judgment as to the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B.1), 201 which
requires county boards of assessors to determine the property value of
"Section 42"202 rent controlled properties by using the present value of
the artificially reduced rental income stream resulting from the owner's
193. Id. at 506, 788 S.E.2d at 94.
194. Id. at 507, 788 S.E.2d at 94-95.
195. 299 Ga. 598, 791 S.E.2d 77 (2016).
196. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, para. 3.
197. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7(a) (2017).
198. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2017).
199. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. 2(a)(1). See also GA. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. 1.
"Except as authorized in or pursuant to this Constitution, all laws exempting property from
ad valorem taxation are void." Id.
200. E.g., Heron Lake II, 299 Ga. at 610 n.10, 791 S.E.2d at 85 n.10 (noting that O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(3)(B.1) was adopted after voters had already rejected a referendum in 2002 that
would have the same effect); compare O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 (2017) (providing "[t]he intent and
purpose of the tax laws of this state are to have all property and subjects of taxation
returned at the value which would be realized from the cash sale, but not the forced sale,
of the property . . . .") with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B)(iv) (2017) (requiring the county boards
of tax assessors to consider bank sales and distressed sales as evidence of fair market
value).
201. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B.1) (2017).
202. I.R.C. § 42 (2017).
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participation in the program 203 but prohibited the assessors from
considering the offsetting value of the related federal and state lowincome housing income tax credits when determining fair market
value. 204 The county board of assessors argued that ignoring the tax
credits amounted to an unconstitutional tax exemption because a third
party would pay a premium to acquire the tax credits as part of that
property's sale price, and therefore, the credits are an essential
component of the fair market value of low-income housing property. 205
The Lowndes County Superior Court agreed and, on appeal, the
impacted taxpayers
argued
that the tax
credits were
not
unconstitutionally exempt because they are intangible personal property
and not required to be uniform within the class of real property. 206 The
appellate court disagreed, noting that, for tax purposes, real property
includes the entire bundle of rights, interests, and benefits connected
with the ownership of real estate. 207 Because the tax credits provide a
source of income to the owner and may be claimed by subsequent
purchasers, they are inextricably bound to the real estate, rather than to
any individual, and their exclusion from consideration "would artificially
depress the value of the property for tax valuation purposes." 208 Notably,

the General Assembly has since amended O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B) to
include

additional

considered, 209

but

instruction

O.C.G.A.

as

to when

such

§ 48-5-2(3)(B.1),

credits

which

may

was

be

ruled

unconstitutional in Heron Lake II,210 remains.
In Cherokee County Board of Tax Assessors v. Mason,211 the court
affirmed the trial court's holding that a taxpayer's testimony that he had
sold timber more than a decade earlier and that he intended to sell timber
again in the future was sufficient to carry his burden of proof with respect
203. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2017). "The income approach, if data are available, shall be
utilized in determining the fair market value of income-producing property, and, if actual
income and expense data are voluntarily supplied by the property owner, such data shall
be considered in such determination." Id.
204. Heron Lake II, 299 Ga. at 598, 791 S.E.2d at 78.
205. Id. at 607, 791 S.E.2d at 83.
206. Id. at 605, 791 S.E.2d at 82.
207. Id. at 605-06, 791 S.E.2d at 83.
208. Id. at 607-08, 791 S.E.2d at 83-84 (quoting Pine Pointe Housing, L.P. v. Lowndes
Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 254 Ga. App. 197, 199, 561 S.E.2d 860, 863 (2002)).
209. See Ga. H.R. Bill 196, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 25 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(I), (II)) (adding paragraphs (vii)(I) and (II), which state that tax credits
may be considered only when they are evidenced by a comparable sale of rent-restricted
property with unused tax credits or the tax assessors are able to show that such credits
generate "actual income").
210. Heron Lake II, 299 Ga. at 610, 791 S.E.2d at 85.
211. 340 Ga. App. 889, 798 S.E.2d 32 (2017).
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to the eligibility of an approximately nine-acre lot with incidental tree
growth for the "bona fide conservation use" (CUVA) tax exemption
authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4.212 The CUVA tax exemption
is available to qualified property ownerS 213 for "bona fide conservation
use property;" 214 environmentally sensitive property; 215 a wildlife habitat
of not less than ten acres; 216 and "bona fide residential transitional
property." 217 Qualifying owners are required to enter into ten-year
covenants with the taxing governing authority to maintain the property
in bona fide qualifying use for a period of ten years.

218

In Mason, the taxpayer submitted an application to enter his property
into a renewal covenant for timber production as "bona fide conservation
use" property, which is limited to "[n]ot more than 2,000 acres .

.

. the

primary purpose of which is any good faith production, including but not
limited to subsistence farming or commercial production, from or on the
land of agricultural products or timber." 219 The tax assessors inspected
the property, noting that there was "substantial undergrowth" and no
"logging road or access road." 220 The tax assessors denied the taxpayer's
application on the grounds that the property was not used for the "good
faith production" 221 of agriculture or timber, and the taxpayer failed to
submit the "additional relevant records regarding proof of bona fide
conservation use." 222 On appeal, the court held that although the

taxpayer had not provided proof of the density or economic
merchantability of the timber or utilized recognized timber practices, 223
subsistence timber production was sufficient and that "good faith
212. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4 (2017).
213. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a)(1)(C)(i)-(iv) (2017).
214. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a) (2017).
215. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a)(2) (2017).
216. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a.1) (2017).
217. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(c) (2017).
218. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(d) (2017).
219. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a)(1) (2017).
220. Mason, 340 Ga. App. at 892, 798 S.E.2d at 35.
221. GA. CoMiP. R. & REGS. 560-11-6-.02(d)(1) (2017). "'Good Faith Production' means: A
viable utilization of the property for the primary purpose of any good faith production,
including, but not limited to, subsistence farming or commercial production, from or on the
land of agricultural products or timber." Id.
222. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(2) (2017).
223. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a)(1)(D) (2017). "Factors which may be considered in determining if such property is qualified may include, but not be limited to: (i) The nature of the
terrain; (ii) The density of the marketable product on the land; (iii) The past usage of the
land; (iv) The economic merchantability of the agricultural product; and (v) The utilization
or nonutilization of recognized care, cultivation, harvesting, and like practices applicable
to the product involved and any implemented plans thereof." Id.

2017]
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production" does not require "intelligent or profitable timbering." 224 The
court further held that, although the taxpayer had not submitted records
related to the production of timber, such requirement did not apply
because he submitted an IRS Schedule F declaring losses from a onequarter acre garden. 225

In DLT List, LLC v. M7VEN Supportive Housing & Development
Group,226 the court resolved longstanding confusion with respect to the
right of redeeming creditors to claim excess funds generated by the sale
of real property under a tax fi. fa. by virtue of the O.C.G.A. § 48-4-43227
"super lien." 228 Tax sales typically result in excess funds, which are held
by the tax commissioner for distribution to interested parties in the order
of priority of their interests in the underlying real property. 229 Such
property may be redeemed by the prior owner, any person with an
interest in or lien on the property, or any creditor of the previous owner
by paying the statutory redemption price, in which case title is conveyed
back to the defendant in fi. fa. and all liens existing at the time of the tax
sale are restored. 230 The redeeming party obtains a first priority "super
lien" for the full redemption price. 231
In DLT List, the redeeming party purchased a pre-tax sale lien on the
property three months after the date of the sale and filed a declaratory
judgment action claiming the right to the excess funds by virtue of its
super lien. 232 The Carroll County Superior Court and the court of appeals
held that the redeeming party had no right to the excess funds because
it was not a lienholder at the time of the sale. 233 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, but not on account of the multiple
224. Mason, 340 Ga. App. at 893, 798 S.E.2d at 36.
225. See O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(2) (2017). "If the owner of the subject property provides
proof that such owner has filed with the Internal Revenue Service a .. . Schedule F ...
pertaining to such property, the provisions of this paragraph, requiring additional relevant
records regarding proof of bona fide conservation use, shall not apply to such property." Id.
226. 301 Ga. 131, 800 S.E.2d 362 (2017).
227. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-43 (2017).
228. Indeed, DLT List expressly overruled United Capital Financial of Atlanta v.
American Investment Associates, 302 Ga. App. 400, 691 S.E.2d 272 (2010), and Wester v.
United CapitalFinancialof Atlanta, LLC, 282 Ga. App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779 (2006), and,
following DLTList, Postell v. Trinitec Portfolio Services, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 283, 799 S.E.2d
597 (2017), Worthwhile Investments, LLC v. Higgins, 337 Ga. App. 183, 787 S.E.2d 245
(2016), and Bridges v. Collins-Hooten, 339 Ga. App. 756, 792 S.E.2d 721 (2016), were each
denied certiorari.
229. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-5(b) (2017).
230. O.C.G.A. §§48-4-40, 48-4-41, 48-4-43 (2017).
231. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-43.
232. DLTList, 301 Ga. at 136, 800 S.E.2d at 366.
233. Id. at 132, 800 S.E.2d at 363-64.
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references to recorded interests "at the time of the tax sale" 234 as was

found dispositive by the lower court, but because an interest in the excess
funds is an interest in personal property and the super lien only takes
priority with respect to interests in real property. 235

234. Id. at 133, 800 S.E.2d at 364.
235. Id. at 135, 800 S.E.2d at 365.

